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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
not the blood reaches a patient depends upon the integrity of the paid
donor 36 in most instances.8 7
Now that the test of predominance has been formulated, trans-
actions which embrace both services and a transfer of property are
required to be viewed in their entirety. This is true even though the
transfer aspect is clearly distinguished by a separate consideration.
Such a transfer may in itself involve no elements of service; however,
because the general relationship between the contracting parties is one
for services, the transfer is deprived of its standing as a sale. Al-
though there be a predominance of services in such cases, this should
not, in justice, preclude a breach of warranty action since the goods
are transferred for a price, distinct from that offered for the services.
The purpose of implied warranty is to afford protection to the
buyer. It is an answer of natural justice to the doctrine of caveat
emptor.88  It is submitted, therefore, that Section 82 be amended to
include transactions in which, though the predominant aspect be ser-
vice, there is a transfer of property for a separate consideration.
A
TORTS-LAcK OF SUPERVISION AS GROUND FOR DENYING Hos-
PITAL ImMUNiTY.-Plaintiff brought suit against defendant hospital
for the wrongful death of his child. The decedent, a baby several
hours old, had been placed in a bassinet and warmed by an electric
lamp I in the hospital nursery. A student nurse, supervisor of the
nursery, moved the lamp close to the child and left the ward to attend
to administrative duties, returning twenty minutes later to find the
bassinet enveloped in flames. The Court, holding that the hospital was
36 Homologous serum jaundice ". . . is produced by the parenteral inocu-
lation of whole blood, serum or plasma, ordinarily obtained from an individual
who is supposedly nonjaundiced, or at least from a donor not known (at the
time) to be ill with infectious hepatitis." Paul, Havens, Sabin, and Philip,
Transmission Experiments in Serum Jaundice and Infectious Hepatitis, 128
J.A.M.A. 911 (1945). The incubation period for infectious hepatitis is from
10-40 days. This period is followed by severe reactions. See GREENBERG AND
MArZ, MODERN CONCEPTs OF CommUNIcAmz DisEAsE 183-184 (1953). Thus,
one usually should be aware of such an affliction and, upon being asked at the
time of giving the blood (which is the usual practice), should volunteer such
information.
37 There may be occasions when a person may sell his blood during the
rather short incubation period of infectious hepatitis.38 See Howard Iron Works v. Buffalo Elevating Co., 113 App. Div. 562,
570, 99 N.Y. Supp. 163, 167 (4th Dep't 1906), aff'd inem., 188 N.Y. 619, 81
N.E. 1166 (1907).
'The use of a light bulb to warm infants is said to be normal hospital




not immune, declared that liability could be predicated upon the re-
moval of the supervisor for the performance of administrative func-
tions.2 Cadicarno v. Long Island College Hospital, 308 N.Y. 196,
124 N.E.2d 279 (1954).
Charitable hospital immunity from tort liability was first approved
in this country in McDonald v. Massachusetts General Hospital.3
Within less than a century, several complex variations of this rule
have developed. Among the reasons advanced by the jurisdictions
granting immunity is the theory that the funds establishing a hospital
are held in trust and should not be diverted for non-charitable pur-
poses.4 Some jurisdictions, in granting immunity, reject the applica-
bility of respondeat superior to charitable institutions since that con-
cept is grounded on the benefits the employer realizes from the acts
of his employee.5 It has also been held that the doctrine is inappli-
cable since the medical service is rendered professionally by nurses or
physicians who are considered to be independent contractors. The
acceptance of charitable treatment has been interpreted as an implied
waiver of the patient's possible cause of action.7 Elsewhere, the im-
munity is recognized because the functions of charity approximate the
objectives of governmental agencies 8 and further public policy.9 An-
other consideration bearing on this question is the status of the injured
party; for some courts deny recovery to patients, yet permit others to
succeed.' 0 In addition, recovery has been allowed against property
not exclusively used to further the objectives for which the trust
2 The judgment of the Appellate Division was reversed; but, since the Trial
Term's findings of fact were not considered by the Appellate Division, the case
was remitted to the latter court for determination of any questions of fact.
3 120 Mass. 432 (1876). See Pierce v. Yakima Valley Memorial Hosp.
Ass'n, 43 Wash.2d 162, 260 P.2d 765, 768 (1953).
4 See Loeffler v. Trustees of Sheppard & Enoch Pratt Hosp., 130 Md. 265,
100 Atl. 301 (1917); Foley v. Wesson Memorial Hosp., 246 Mass. 363, 141
N.E. 113 (1923).
5 Cf. Bachman v. YWCA, 179 Wis. 178, 191 N.W. 751 (1922) ; see Hearns
v. Waterbury Hosp., 66 Conn. 98, 33 At. 595 (1895).
6 Schloendorff v. New York Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914);
cf. Hamburger v. Cornell, 240 N.Y. 328, 148 N.E. 539 (1925).
7 See Wilcox v. Idaho Falls Latter Day Saints Hosp., 59 Idaho 350, 82
P.2d 849 (1938) ; Adams v. University Hosp., 122 Mo. App. 675, 99 S.W. 453
(1907).
8 See University of Louisville v. Hammock, 127 Ky. 564, 106 S.W. 219,
221 (1907).
9 See Weston v. Hosp. of St. Vincent, 131 Va. 587, 107 S.E. 785 (1921);
cf. Southern Methodist University v. Clayton, 142 Tex. 179, 176 S.W.2d 749
(1943).
10 See Henry W. Putnam Memorial Hosp. v. Allen, 34 F.2d 927 (2d Cir.
1929) (where a motorist was injured by defendant's ambulance); Sisters of
Charity v. Duvelius, 123 Ohio St. 52, 173 N.E. 737 (1930) (private nurse).
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was established." Finally, the minority of jurisdictions permit no
immunity.12
The English case of Hillyer v. Governors of St. Bartholomew's
Hospital,13 decided after the turn of the century, has had a marked
influence in England and New York. This decision, regarded as au-
thority for the doctrine of charitable hospital immunity for the neg-
ligent professional, but not administrative, acts of its staff,14 was
quoted with approval in the case of Schloendorff v. New York Hos-
pital,'5 which established the rule in New York. This area of pro-
tection, based on the independent contractor theory, was logically
expanded by later New York cases to include profit-making hos-
pitals 16 as well as private corporations furnishing medical treatment.17
While immunity was being thus extended, several exceptions to the
immunity rule were being developed. Besides the vicarious liability
imposed for the negligent administrative acts of their employees and
staff,' 8 hospitals were held directly liable for negligent selection of
medical personnel,19 the use of defective equipment 2 0 and for negligent
supervision.
21
The professional-administrative test of the Schloendorff case re-
mained the accepted rule in New York for determining the liability of
hospitals.22 As a result of the application of that test, however, con-
flicting decisions were rendered in cases in which the fact patterns, as
"See O'Quin v. Baptist Memorial Hosp., 184 Tenn. 570, 201 S.W.2d 694,
696 (1947).
12 See, e.g., Ray v. Tucson Medical Center, 72 Ariz. 22, 230 P.2d 220 (1951);
Pierce v. Yakima Valley Memorial Hosp. Ass'n, 43 Wash.2d 162, 260 P.2d 765
(1953).
13 [1909] 2 K.B. 820 (C.A.).
14 See Murray, Hospitals and the Law of Negligence, 59 ScoT. L. REv. 177
(1943).
15211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914)..
16 See Bakal v. University Heights Sanitarium, Inc., 277 App. Div. 572,
101 N.Y.S.2d 385 (1st Dep't 1950), aff'd mern., 302 N.Y. 870, 100 N.E.2d 51
(1951).
1" See Mrachek v. Sunshine Biscuit, Inc., 308 N.Y. 116, 120, 123 N.E.2d 801,
803 (1954).
18 See Dillon v. Rockaway Beach Hosp., 284 N.Y. 176, 30 N.E.2d 373
(1940); Iacono v. N.Y. Polyclinic Hosp., 269 App. Div. 955, 58 N.Y.S.2d 244(2d Dep't 1945), aff'd nen,., 296 N.Y. 502, 68 N.E.2d 450 (1946).
29 Howe v. Medical Arts Hosp., 261 App. Div. 1088, 26 N.Y.S.2d 957 (2d
Dep't 1941), aff'd mere., 287 N.Y. 698, 39 N.E.2d 303 (1942); cf. White v.
Prospect Heights Hosp., 278 App. Div. 789, 790, 103 N.Y.S.2d 859, 860 (2d
Dep't 1951).20 Woodhouse v. Knickerbocker Hosp., 39 N.Y.S.2d 671 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd
mein., 266 App. Div. 839, 43 N.Y.S.2d 518 (1st Dep't 1943).
21 See Santos v. Unity Hosp., 301 N.Y. 153, 93 N.E.2d 574 (1950); Van
Patter v. Charles B. Towns Hosp., 246 N.Y. 646, 159 N.E. 686 (1927). In
Roche v. St. John's Riverside Hosp., 93 Misc. 289, 160 N.Y. Supp. 401 (Sup.
Ct.), aff'd mere., 176 App. Div. 885, 161 N.Y. Supp. 1143 (2d Dep't 1916), an
infant was burned to death by contact with a steam pipe because of the hos-
pital's failure to exercise careful supervision. However, the court based lia-
bility on the hospital's breach of its contract to care for the infant.
22 See note 18 supra.
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far as negligent supervision was concerned, were similar.23 It is to be
noted that these cases were decided prior to 1950, and the more recent
cases show less preoccupation with the professional-administrative
test and more concentration with the imposition of liability on the
ground of negligent supervision. 24  In the case of Santos v. Unity
Hospital,25 decided in 1950, the court, in denying the hospital im-
munity, ignored completely the distinction between administrative and
professional acts. There, the supervisory nurse of a hospital labor
room was required to leave the room to attend to other duties. In
her absence, the patient became mentally deranged and fell to her
death. The court held that the hospital's negligence in failing to
secure the windows, or to provide constant supervision, precluded
immunity.
The Court in the instant case reconciled its decision with the
administrative-professional test.26 Nevertheless, the Santos case was
held to be clearly controlling since ". . . it was the administrative
requirements of the hospital which took from the patient the compe-
tent care and supervision to which she was entitled .... ,, 27 The
Court indicated that the facts found in the principal case were much
stronger than those presented in the Santos case. In the latter case
the danger was remote and the patient was an adult, whereas, in the
instant case, the danger was imminent and the patient was a newborn
child.
The horror of the tort involved militates against objections to
the decision in the instant case. However, the need for New York
to reappraise its present position on hospital immunity is apparent.
As might well be expected, the application of the professional-
administrative test has created fine distinctions in judicial attempts
to adhere to precedent, while rendering equitable individual judg-
ments. In an extreme example, an interne and a nurse negligently
administered a transfusion to the wrong patient. In imposing liability
upon the hospital, it was held that the professional nature of the act
23 Compare Andrews v. The Roosevelt Hosp., 259 App. Div. 733, 18 N.Y.S.2d
447 (2d Dep't 1940) (where a patient fell from a table after an orderly left
the room; and, since, had the orderly remained, he would have been performing
a nurse's duties, the court unanimously granted immunity), with Petry v.
Nassau Hosp., 267 App. Div. 996, 48 N.Y.S.2d 227 (2d Dep't), motion for leave
to appeal denied, 293 N.Y. 937 (1944) (where a patient fell from a table after
being left without supervision by the nurse in charge of the room, and the
court unanimously imposed liability).
24 See Cadicamo v. Long Island College Hosp., 308 N.Y. 196, 124 N.E.2d
279 (1954) ; Santos v. Unity Hosp., supra note 21; Murray v. St. Mary's Hosp.,
280 App. Div. 803, 113 N.Y.S.2d 104 (2d Dep't 1952).
25 301 N.Y. 153, 93 N.E.2d 574 (1950).
26 While the use of the lamp to warm the child was a medical (professional)
act, it was the assigned administrative duties that exposed the baby to danger.
See Cadicamo v. Long Island College Hosp., supra note 24 at 2021, 124 N.E.2d
at 281.
27 Id. at 203, 124 N.E.2d at 282.
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ceased the moment the threshold of the wrong room was crossed.28
This confusion and uncertainty has been remedied in England, where
the courts have discarded the nebulous distinctions between admin-
istrative and professional acts and have ruled that the negligence of
a physician 29 or nurse 3 0 is imputed to the employing hospital. In
this country, hospital immunity has been strongly condemned in text
and treatise.3 1 Perhaps in response to this criticism, the recent trend
throughout the nation has been to reduce or eliminate immunity. Thir-
teen years ago but three states permitted no immunity, 2 whereas
today at least seventeen jurisdictions have explicitly or impliedly
adopted a complete liability rule.83 It is to be hoped that New York,
experiencing the difficulties that plagued other American jurisdictions
and England, will respond by doing away with hospital immunity.
)X
TORTS - LIABILITY FOR MAINTENANCE OF A DANGEROUS IN-
STRUM ENTALITY ON PREMISS.-Plaintiff brought suit for the wrong-
ful death of his twelve-year-old son who plunged through a hoistway
opening on defendants' platform. The platform was located midway
in an alley which, although fenced off, was frequently entered by
school children through a space beneath the fence. The Court held
that by placing an insecure and deceptive covering over the opening,
the defendants created an inherently "dangerous instrumentality" for
which they are liable. Mayer v. Temple Properties, Inc., 307 N.Y.
559, 122 N.E.2d 909 (1954).
Generally, a possessor of land is not subject to liability for bodily
harm caused to trespassers as a result of his failure either to keep his
land in a safe condition or to carry on activities so as not to endanger
them.' An increasing regard for human safety has led to the devel-
opment of certain exceptions to this rule of non-liability.2 One such
28 See Necolayff v. Genesee Hosp., 270 App. Div. 648, 61 N.Y.S.2d 832
(4th Dep't 1946), aff'd nwem., 296 N.Y. 936, 73 N.E.2d 117 (1947).
29 See Cassidy v. Ministry of Health, [1951] 2 K.B. 343, 351.
3 0 See Gold v. Essex County Council, [1942] 2 K.B. 293, 313 (C.A.).
31 See 2A BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 401 (1953); PROSSER, TORTS
1079 (1941); 3 ScoTT, TRUSTS §402 (1939).
32 See President and Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F.2d
810, 819 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
33 See Note, 25 A.L.R.2d 29, 142 (1953), which lists fifteen jurisdictions
as imposing, or tending to impose, complete liability. Since the publication of
that volume, Kansas and Washington have adopted this rule. See Noel v.
Menninger Foundation, 175 Kan. 751, 267 P.2d 934 (1954); Pierce v. Yakima
Valley Memorial Hosp. Ass'n, 43 Wash.2d 162, 260 P.2d 765 (1953).
1 See RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 333 (1934).
2 See PROSSER, TORTS 609 (1941).
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